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Introduction 
In relation to employment law, the Privacy Act, which came into force on I July I993, can 
be usefully characterised as both a human rights statute and a freedom of information 
statute. 
Before proceeding to discuss the Privacy Act under these two broad headings, ~t will be 
necessary to grasp the basic conceptual jargon of the Act . The currency of the Pnvacy Act 
is "personal information," which is defined in s.2 as "information about an identifiable 
individual." The term "information" itself is not defined, which appears to be deliberate, 
as to define a word is to limit it. 
For the Privacy Act to apply, the personal information in question must be collected, held, 
or used by an ".agency". The term "agency" is used to denote individuals and organisations 
in both the public and private sectors that are subject to the requirements of the Act. The 
few exceptions to the definition of "agency" are listed under s.2; they are entities such as 
the Sovereign, the House of Representatives, and the courts. This means in practice that 
virtually every individual and organisation in New Zealand today falls under the definition 
of "agency". 
The "Information Privacy Principles" in s.6 are a set of twelve rules, together with limited 
exceptions to those rules, that are binding on agencies and around which much of the 
Privacy Act is structured. These deal with matters relating to access to and the collection, 
security, correction, accuracy, retention, use and disclosure of personal information, and the 
assigning of unique identifiers (for example, identification numbers). These I2 principles 
constitute the basic rules with which we are concerned. 
The Privacy Act as human rights legislation 
As human rights legislation, the Privacy Act is the direct product of relatively recent 
developments on the international scene. With rapid advances in information technology 
and the increased role played by government in the lives of its citizens in the latter half of 
the twentieth century, international attention has been directed to the formulation of 
standards in accordance with which the la'w might strike the right balance between the 
protection of individuals' privacy and the pursuit. o'f;. legitimate activities by business and 
government. This has been reflected by Article 12 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
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Human Rights and Article I7 of the I966 United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ratified by New Zealand in I978). More recently, and specifically in relation to 
information privacy, in I980 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) recommended a set of Guidelines Concerning the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data, to which New Zealand was also a signatory. 
The long title of the Privacy Act states that the general purpose of the Act is "to· promote 
and protect individual privacy" in accordance with these OECD Guidelines. The enactment 
of the Privacy Act now brings New Zealand in line with a number of other developed 
nations which have adopted similar legislation, including Sweden, the United States, 
Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia. 
The interest individuals have in controlling information about themselves and in enjoying 
freedom from unreasonable intrusion into their personal affairs has long been recognised 
as raising human rights issues. Such issues are especially relevant to institutional settings 
such as the employment context. The basis for much of the concern about employees' 
privacy stems from their inherent powerlessness to assert their privacy interests, and from 
the traditional disinterest and weakness of the law in compensating for this lack of power 
in the employment relationship. Job applicants and employees are normally the weaker 
party in the relationship; therefore, they are not in a position to deny requests by an 
employment agency or employer that amount to unwarranted intrusions into their personal 
affairs. While the individual may in law consent to the intrusion, it is only because the 
relationship is one of unequal power. 
The Privacy Act, however, imposes limits on the extent to which an individual's privacy 
can lawfully be invaded. The Act thus purports to redress the power imbalance somewhat 
by placing rest~ictions on the collection, handling, and use of information by agencies such 
as employers and employment agencies. 
One common privacy concern involves information requested from job applicants or 
employees that is unnecessarily intrusive and seemingly irrelevant to the purpose for which 
it is being sought. Such information would include, for example, criminal convictions far 
in the past for offences that are in nature unrelated to the employment concerned; 
personality test true/false responses to questions such as "I dream frequently of things that 
are best kept to myself' (asked, unknown to the individual concerned, in order to catch out 
the subject who is "faking-good"); and medical certificates in cases of absence that are 
required to disclose with unnecessary specificity the nature of the employee's illness. 
Under the Privacy Act, however, the employer or employment agency is not allowed to 
collect personal information unless the collection of the information is necessary for a 
purpose connected with a function or activity of the agency (Principle I); the individual 
must be aware of the fact that the information is being collected, and the purpose for which 
it is being collected (Principle 3); and it must not be collected by means that are unfair or 
unreasonably intrusive in the circumstances (Principle 4). 
There is a clear relationship here with the Human Rights Act. The Human Rights Act deals 
with acting on the basis of particular prohibited grounds of discrimination. This indirectly 
discourages the collection of some classes of personal information (such as that relating 
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to political or religious affiliations and marital or family status). Moreover, s.15 of the 
Human Rights Act makes it unlawful "to use or circulate any form of application for 
employment or to make any inquiry of or about any applicant for employment" that 
suggests that a decision will be made on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination. 
The Privacy Act overlaps with such provisions since it applies to the collection of all 
information that is either irrelevant to the employment decision to be made or that is 
unreasonably intrusive. 
Another privacy concern arises where an employment agency or prospective employer 
obtains information from third parties without the knowledge or consent of the prospective 
employee. This is inevitably the case with "headhunters," who would be working largely 
behind the scene. However, even in cases where interest has been registered in seeking 
employment, the agency may contact third parties formally or informally to seek 
verification of details provided by the applicant, and perhaps additional information. 
Personal information might also be sought through other channels as well, such as the 
police, business connections, and friends. In a country the size of New Zealand, the use 
of informal channels of information is bound to be great. The practice of blacklisting 
suspected "trouble-making" employees is occasionally cited, but it is difficult to confirm 
whether, and if so, to what extent this practice exists. According to Privacy Principle 2, 
however, an agency can only collect personal information "directly from the individual 
concerned" unless the collection can be brought under the exceptions listed. 
At the end of the application and vetting process, the employer or employment agency is 
bound to have quite a lot of information about both the successful and unsuccessful 
applicants. There are concerns about preserving the confidentiality and preventing the 
misuse of such material. The same concerns apply to information held about an employee 
during and after the employment relationship. Personnel records commonly contain a great 
deal of information about employees, such as bank account numbers for direct deposit 
payments, wages and time records, P AYE records, IRD numbers, home addresses, marital 
status, accident and health information (which may include details about current health 
status and the presence of disease, disability, or addiction), disciplinary records, 
performance appraisals, references, and curricula vitae (which in turn include details 
concerning work history, education, and other personal information). There are concerns 
that personal information may be disclosed without authorisation to third parties, ~uch as 
other employers, debt collectors, private investigators, credit bureaux, banks, and insurance 
companies. The Privacy Act requires that personal information be protected against 
unauthorised access, use, disclosure and other misuse (Principle 5); that personal 
information should not be kept for longer than necessary (Principle 9); that strict limits 
be imposed on the use of personal information for purposes other than those for which they 
were obtained (Principle 1 0); and that strict limits be imposed on the disclosure of personal 
information to third parties (Principle 11 ). 
Another privacy concern involves surveillance of e~ployees. Electronic surveillance has 
become an increasingly accessible option for most employers. It may be used for security 
reasons, such as the detection of pilfering, or for monitoring job performance. Monitoring 
telephone use is a particularly common practice, especially by means of logging systems 
that are able to record the time, duration, destination, and cost of telephone calls. Principle 
3 requires an agency to: 
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. . . take such steps (if any) as are, in the circumstances, reasonable to ensure that the 
individual concerned is aware of 
(a) The fact that the information is being collected; and 
(b) The purpose for which the information is being collected ... 
One e~ception to this ~rin~iple is where the agency believes, on reasonable grourids, "That 
comp~Iance would preJUdice the purposes of the collection" (para.(4)(d)). Accordingly 
~w:'e.tllance and monitoring without the individual's knowledge appear to be permissibl~ 
If I~ I~ necessary .for a lawful ~urpose .connected with the agency's function or activity 
(Prmciple 1) and If the means, m the circumstances of the case, are not unfair or do not 
intrude to an unreasonable extent upon the personal affairs of the individual concerned 
(Principle 4). If the collection or use of personal information is made in breach of this or 
ano~er of th~ I~ormati~n .Pr~vacy Principles, and the information is relied upon for a 
deci~IOn to dismiss or diSCipline an employee, this in itself may constitute procedural 
unfairness. 1 
Like the Human Rights Act, the Privacy Act is very much aimed at behaviour modification. 
The Information Privacy Principles establish norms of conduct for agencies in relation to 
th~ir . colle.ction~ handling, and use of personal information. Compliance with these 
pnnciples IS assisted by the rights granted to individuals to have access to information about 
themsel:ves and to s~~k .correction of it. The Privacy Act's complaints procedures place 
emphasis upon concihatwn and the reaching of voluntary settlements. In the last resort 
unresol.ved complaints und~r the Privacy Act, like those under the Human Rights Act, ar; 
determmed by the Complamts Review Tribunal. 
The Privacy Act as freedom of information legislation 
It is important to appreciate the relationship between the Privacy Act and New Zealand's 
two other freedom of information statutes, the Official Information Act 1982 ("the OIA") 
and the Loca~ G?vernme?t Official Information and Meetings Act 1987 ("the LGOIMA"). 
There are sigruficant Interconnections among the three statutes in subject matter 
jurisprudence, and administration. In short, the three enactments must be viewed ~ 
complementary components of the same overall statutory scheme. 
Information Privacy Principles 6 and 7 give individuals rights of access to and correction 
of information .about themselves. In terms of subject matter, therefore, the Privacy Act has 
taken over ~ Import~t aspect of the official information regime through its coverage of 
all personal mformahon held by public sector agencies relating to natural, as opposed to 
corp?ra:e, persons. The effect of the new legislation has been largely to remove the 
apphcatwn of the OIA and LGOIMA to natural persons and transfer their coverage to the 
Pnva~y Act, the scope of which extends beyond the public sector to cover private sector 
agencies as well. 
Cf. Graham v Christchurch Polytechnic, unreported, CEC 48/93, 14/9/93, Palmer J., p.25. 
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In its role as a freedom of information statute, therefore, the Privacy Act has particularly 
significant implications for employment law. This is because it enables private sector 
employees to enjoy the same rights of access to and correction of personal information held 
by their employer as were enjoyed previously only by public sector employees under the 
freedom of information legislation. Moreover, these rights of access and correction extend 
to personal information held by all agencies that are subject to the Act. Thus, both private 
and public sector employees now also have access to personal information held by such 
agencies as employment agencies, trade unions, professional and trade associations, and 
those in a client or contractor relationship with the employer. 
These new rights of access mean that employees who have been dismissed, disciplined, or 
otherwise disadvantaged are prima facie entitled to access to all information held about 
them by their employer or former employer. This would include diary notes, 
communications with industrial consultants that are not protected by legal professional 
privilege, internal memoranda, and in fact anything that is about the individual concerned. 
Access to such information is likely to be helpful in deciding whether or not to pursue a 
personal grievance. Moreover, if one is pursued, the right to access enables an applicant 
to gather evidence without the pleadings in the case having to be filed first in order to seek 
an order for discovery. In addition, an individual should be entitled to obtain a copy or 
written record of his or her individual employment contract after the employment 
relationship has ended, a right not presently conferred under s.19 of the Employment 
Contracts Act. Other types of personal information, such as performance appraisals, 
management comments about individuals, and details of personnel decisions concerning 
individuals should all normally be accessible under the Act by the employee concerned, 
whether the motive behind the request is contemplated litigation or mere curiosity. 
By virtue of the Privacy Act's savings provision (s.7), an employer would be justified in 
refusing to generate a statement of reasons for an employee's dismissal if requested to do 
so outside the 60 day period specified by s.38 of the Employment Contracts Act. However, 
the savings provision will not affect an employee's entitlement to disclosure of existing 
material held by the employer relating to the reasons for the dismissal, or the generation of 
a statement by the employer in relation to any matter other than the reasons for the 
dismissal (such as the reasons behind a final warning). 
/ 
The Privacy Act gives individuals access to personal information about themselves 
regardless of whether that information was obtained before or after 1 July 1993 (s.8(2)). 
As was the position under the OIA and the LGOIMA, personal information held by public 
sector agencies is available free of charge (s.35(1)). Private sector agencies are permitted 
to require a payment for making information available, partly in order to discourage 
excessive or vexatious requests. Any such charge, however, must be a reasonable one 
(s.35(5)). An agency has up to 20 working days for deciding whether or not to grant a 
request for information (s.40(1)); provision is made for extension of this time limit in 
certain circumstances (s.41). The information itself must be made available without "undue 
delay," or else this is deemed to be a refusal to make 'tlie information available (s.66(4)). 
Where information is refused, the agency must give its reasons and inform the requester of 
the right to seek an investigation and review of the refusal by the Privacy Commissioner 
(s.44). 
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As a corollary to the right of access under Principle 6, individuals also have the right to 
seek correction of their personal information (Principle 7). This right is connected with the 
duty of agencies to ensure that personal information is accurate (Principle 8). The right to 
seek correction of information that may be misleading or inaccurate is a valuable one, for 
inaccurate information may be relied upon, for example, in order to prepare a reference, 
obtain a loan, or for purposes relating to superannuation or health insurance. Moreover, an 
employee's records may include a supervisor's comments in relation to competency, 
conduct, or matters such as suspected substance abuse, which in fairness (and therefore in 
accordance with good industrial practice) ought to be brought to the employee's notice 
before being acted upon, so that the employee can have an opportunity to put his or her 
side of the story. 
Because the Privacy Act deals with the same conceptual currency as the OIA and the 
LGOIMA, its jurisprudence will inevitably draw to a great extent on the existing 
jurisprudence of those earlier freedom of information statutes. Many of the relevant 
provisions of the Privacy Act are cast in identical terms, and it is to be expected that the 
very great guidance given over the years by the Ombudsmen in the interpretation of terms 
and the application of concepts in those earlier enactments will be followed by the Privacy 
Commissioner. Such, at any rate, is arguably the implied intention of Parliament in 
modeling many of the Privacy Act's provisions on those of the earlier freedom of 
information statutes. 
For example, the various acceptable grounds that justify an agency in refusing disclosure 
of personal information to the individual concerned are all drawn from the OIA and the 
LGOIMA. There is therefore a ready-made jurisprudence dealing with this very important 
aspect of the Privacy Act. Chief among these good reasons for refusing access to personal 
information is subs.29( 1 )(b), which applies if: 
The disclosure of the information or of information identifying the person who supplied it, 
being evaluative material, would breach an express or implied promise --
(i) Which was made to the person who supplied the information; and 
(ii) Which was to the effect that the information or the identity of the person 
who supplied it or both would be held in confidence. 
On its face, this provision might be thought to protect material such as performance 
appraisals, interview notes and reports, and references from disclosure to the individuals to 
whom they relate. However, s.29(1) is framed as making provision for a series of 
permzsszve reasons for refusing disclosure ("An agency may refuse to disclose any 
information requested pursuant to principle 6 if--"). Accordingly, the Ombudsmen have 
long held that this discretion should be exercised in a fair and reasonable way.2 Moreover, 
if the supplier of the evaluative material is another employee or a contractor engaged by 
the employer, it is unlikely that there would be an implied promise of confidentiality, and 
if there is an express promise of confidentiality, it may not be reasonable to invoke it as 
a good reason for withholding the information, since in both cases the information is 
supplied not in reliance on any promise of confidentiality (whether implied or express), but 
Cf. Case No. 129 (1985) 6 CCNO 98, at 100 (G.R. Laking); (1993) 10 Compendium ofCase Notes 
of the Ombudsmen, vol.2, p.ll 0. 
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in the performance of one's duties; as the Ombudsman has put it, "the promise must be 
operative in inducing the supply of information". 3 Such would clearly be the case, 
however, where there is the gratuitous supply of a job reference, since the promise of 
confidentiality can easily be implied. Moreover, without such an understanding, the supply 
of such information would be prejudiced, making reliance on subs.29( 1 )(b) in this instance 
reasonable. 
The two other freedom of information statutes impinge on the Privacy Act m other 
significant ways as well: 
1. Access to personal information comprised in evaluative material may be less 
problematic if it is held by a public sector agency, because under s.23 of the OIA 
and s.22 of the LGOIMA individuals are entitled as of right to be informed about 
the essential contents of such material if it has been relied upon in making a 
decision about the individual concerned. The Ombudsman has commented in this 
regard that: 
Once relied on, the evaluative material would have become part of the decision-maker's 
''findings on material issues of fact" and "reasons for the decision and recommendation." 4 
2. Information Privacy Principle 6 deals only with access to personal information that 
is held "in such a way that it can readily be retrieved." Where such information is 
not readily retrievable and held by a public sector agency, it will be official 
information that may be sought under Parts II of the OIA and the LGOIMA. 
3. In respect to personal information held by public sector agencies, the OIA and the 
LGOIMA will extend the otherwise strict limits imposed by Information Privacy 
Principle 11 governing the disclosure of personal information to third parties. This 
is because the disclosure of such information will also be governed by subs. 9( 1) and 
9(2)(a) of the OIA (cf. subs.7(1) and 7(2)(a) of the LGOIMA). This means that the 
limits on disclosure of such information will be more flexible than those applying 
to information held by private sector agencies. Whereas information held by the 
latter "shall not be disclosed" to third parties unless it falls under one of the 
permitted categories listed in Principle 11, personal information held by public 
sector agencies is subject to a two stage test under which countervailing public 
interests favouring disclosure (such as individual justice) must be considered. 
4. There are a number of areas where the Ombudsmen and the Privacy Commissioner 
will have overlapping jurisdictions and duties of consultation with each other (see 
ss.72, 117, and s.29B of the OIA and s.29A of the LGOIMA). 
Case No 157, (1986) 7 CCNO 141, at p.l46 (L. J. Castle); cf. Re Low and Department of Defence 
(1983-84) 6 ALD 280; (1984) 2 AAR·142 (Cth AAt); Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Aust) Ltd 
v Department ofCommunity Services and Health (1991) 28 FCR 291, at pp.302f. (F.C.). 
10 CCNO vol. 2, p. 111 ; cf. Case No. A 255 (N. Tollemache) and Case No. W2834 (J. Robertson). 
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To sum up, the Privacy Act is highly relevant to the employment context. In particular, it 
is likely to prove a useful tool for employees and their advocates who know how to make 
use of it, and a source of potential pitfalls for those employers who are unaware of its 
provisions. 
